Awesome Slop

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A convenient collection of studies on the limitations of LLMs and where the Slop Machine tends to break down

• Context Rot: How Increasing Input Tokens Impacts LLM Performance
  • Large Language Models (LLMs) are typically presumed to process context uniformly—that is, the model should handle the 10,000th token just as reliably as the 100th. However, in practice, this assumption does not hold. We observe that model performance varies significantly as input length changes, even on simple tasks. In this report, we evaluate 18 LLMs, including the state-of-the-art GPT-4.1, Claude 4, Gemini 2.5, and Qwen3 models. Our results reveal that models do not use their context uniformly; instead, their performance grows increasingly unreliable as input length grows.
• Beyond Memorization: Violating Privacy Via Inference with Large Language Models
  • Current privacy research on large language models (LLMs) primarily focuses on the issue of extracting memorized training data. At the same time, models’ inference capabilities have increased drastically. This raises the key question of whether current LLMs could violate individuals’ privacy by inferring personal attributes from text given at inference time. In this work, we present the first comprehensive study on the capabilities of pretrained LLMs to infer personal attributes from text. We construct a dataset consisting of real Reddit profiles, and show that current LLMs can infer a wide range of personal attributes (e.g., location, income, sex), achieving up to 85% top-1 and 95% top-3 accuracy at a fraction of the cost (100x) and time (240x) required by humans. As people increasingly interact with LLM-powered chatbots across all aspects of life, we also explore the emerging threat of privacy-invasive chatbots trying to extract personal information through seemingly benign questions. Finally, we show that common mitigations, i.e., text anonymization and model alignment, are currently ineffective at protecting user privacy against LLM inference. Our findings highlight that current LLMs can infer personal data at a previously unattainable scale. In the absence of working defenses, we advocate for a broader discussion around LLM privacy implications beyond memorization, striving for a wider privacy protection
• Causal Parrots: Large Language Models May Talk Causality But Are Not Causal
  • Some argue scale is all what is needed to achieve AI, covering even causal models. We make it clear that large language models (LLMs) cannot be causal and give reason onto why sometimes we might feel otherwise. To this end, we define and exemplify a new subgroup of Structural Causal Model (SCM) that we call meta SCM which encode causal facts about other SCM within their variables. We conjecture that in the cases where LLM succeed in doing causal inference, underlying was a respective meta SCM that exposed correlations between causal facts in natural language on whose data the LLM was ultimately trained. If our hypothesis holds true, then this would imply that LLMs are like parrots in that they simply recite the causal knowledge embedded in the data. Our empirical analysis provides favoring evidence that current LLMs are even weak `causal parrots.'
• A Primer on Large Language Models and their Limitations
  • This paper provides a primer on Large Language Models (LLMs) and identifies their strengths, limitations, applications and research directions. It is intended to be useful to those in academia and industry who are interested in gaining an understanding of the key LLM concepts and technologies, and in utilising this knowledge in both day to day tasks and in more complex scenarios where this technology can enhance current practices and processes.
• Evaluation and mitigation of the limitations of large language models in clinical decision-making
  • Clinical decision-making is one of the most impactful parts of a physician’s responsibilities and stands to benefit greatly from artificial intelligence solutions and large language models (LLMs) in particular. However, while LLMs have achieved excellent performance on medical licensing exams, these tests fail to assess many skills necessary for deployment in a realistic clinical decision-making environment, including gathering information, adhering to guidelines, and integrating into clinical workflows. Here we have created a curated dataset based on the Medical Information Mart for Intensive Care database spanning 2,400 real patient cases and four common abdominal pathologies as well as a framework to simulate a realistic clinical setting. We show that current state-of-the-art LLMs do not accurately diagnose patients across all pathologies (performing significantly worse than physicians), follow neither diagnostic nor treatment guidelines, and cannot interpret laboratory results, thus posing a serious risk to the health of patients. Furthermore, we move beyond diagnostic accuracy and demonstrate that they cannot be easily integrated into existing workflows because they often fail to follow instructions and are sensitive to both the quantity and order of information. Overall, our analysis reveals that LLMs are currently not ready for autonomous clinical decision-making while providing a dataset and framework to guide future studies
• On the Limitations of Large Language Models (LLMs): False Attribution
  • In this work, we introduce a new hallucination metric - Simple Hallucination Index (SHI) and provide insight into one important limitation of the parametric knowledge of large language models (LLMs), i.e. false attribution. The task of automatic author attribution for relatively small chunks of text is an important NLP task but can be challenging. We empirically evaluate the power of 3 open SotA LLMs in zero-shot setting (Gemma-7B, Mixtral 8x7B, and LLaMA-2-13B). We acquired the top 10 most popular books of a month, according to Project Gutenberg, divided each one into equal chunks of 400 words, and prompted each LLM to predict the author. We then randomly sampled 162 chunks per book for human evaluation, based on the error margin of 7% and a confidence level of 95%. The average results show that Mixtral 8x7B has the highest prediction accuracy, the lowest SHI, and a Pearson’s correlation (r) of 0.724, 0.263, and -0.9996, respectively, followed by LLaMA-2-13B and Gemma-7B. However, Mixtral 8x7B suffers from high hallucinations for 3 books, rising as high as a SHI of 0.87 (in the range 0-1, where 1 is the worst). The strong negative correlation of accuracy and SHI, given by r, demonstrates the fidelity of the new hallucination metric, which may generalize to other tasks. We also show that prediction accuracies correlate positively with the frequencies of Wikipedia instances of the book titles instead of the downloads and we perform error analyses of predictions. We publicly release the annotated chunks of data and our codes to aid the reproducibility and evaluation of other models
• Fundamental Limitations of Generative LLMs
  • Given the impressive performances of LLM-derived tools across a range of tasks considered all but impossible for computers until recently, the capabilities of LLMs seem limitless. However, there are some fundamental limitations to what they can or cannot do inherent to the current architecture of LLMs. I will attempt to review the most notable of them to give the reader an understanding of what architectural modifications will need to take place before a given problem is solved. Specifically, I discuss counterfactual generation, private information leakage, reasoning, limited attention span, dependence on the training dataset, bias, and non-normative language
• The Illusion of Thinking: Understanding the Strengths and Limitations of Reasoning Models via the Lens of Problem Complexity
  • Recent generations of frontier language models have introduced Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) that generate detailed thinking processes before providing answers. While these models demonstrate improved performance on reasoning benchmarks, their fundamental capabilities, scaling properties, and limitations remain insufficiently understood. Current evaluations primarily focus on established mathematical and coding benchmarks, emphasizing final answer accuracy. However, this evaluation paradigm often suffers from data contamination and does not provide insights into the reasoning traces’ structure and quality. In this work, we systematically investigate these gaps with the help of controllable puzzle environments that allow precise manipulation of compositional complexity while maintaining consistent logical structures. This setup enables the analysis of not only final answers but also the internal reasoning traces, offering insights into how LRMs “think”. Through extensive experimentation across diverse puzzles, we show that frontier LRMs face a complete accuracy collapse beyond certain complexities. Moreover, they exhibit a counter-intuitive scaling limit: their reasoning effort increases with problem complexity up to a point, then declines despite having an adequate token budget. By comparing LRMs with their standard LLM counterparts under equivalent inference compute, we identify three performance regimes: (1) low-complexity tasks where standard models surprisingly outperform LRMs, (2) medium-complexity tasks where additional thinking in LRMs demonstrates advantage, and (3) high-complexity tasks where both models experience complete collapse. We found that LRMs have limitations in exact computation: they fail to use explicit algorithms and reason inconsistently across puzzles. We also investigate the reasoning traces in more depth, studying the patterns of explored solutions and analyzing the models’ computational behavior, shedding light on their strengths, limitations, and ultimately raising crucial questions about their true reasoning capabilities
• Lost in Transmission: When and Why LLMs Fail to Reason Globally
  • Despite their many successes, transformer-based large language models (LLMs) continue to struggle with tasks that require complex reasoning over large parts of their input. We argue that these failures arise due to capacity limits on the accurate flow of information within LLMs. To formalize this issue, we introduce the bounded attention prefix oracle (BAPO) model, a new computational framework that models bandwidth constraints on attention heads, the mechanism for internal communication in LLMs. We show that several important reasoning problems like graph reachability require high communication bandwidth for BAPOs to solve; we call these problems BAPO-hard. Our experiments corroborate our theoretical predictions: GPT-4o, Claude, and Gemini succeed on BAPO-easy tasks and fail even on relatively small BAPO-hard tasks. BAPOs also reveal another benefit of chain of thought (CoT): we prove that breaking down a task using CoT can turn any BAPO-hard problem into a BAPO-easy one. Our results offer principled explanations for key LLM failures and suggest directions for architectures and inference methods that mitigate bandwidth limits
• Premise Order Matters in Reasoning with Large Language Models
  • Large language models (LLMs) have accomplished remarkable reasoning performance in various domains. However, in the domain of reasoning tasks, we discover a frailty: LLMs are surprisingly brittle to the ordering of the premises, despite the fact that such ordering does not alter the underlying task. In particular, we observe that LLMs achieve the best performance when the premise order aligns with the context required in intermediate reasoning steps. For example, in deductive reasoning tasks, presenting the premises in the same order as the ground truth proof in the prompt (as opposed to random ordering) drastically increases the model’s accuracy. We first examine the effect of premise ordering on deductive reasoning on a variety of LLMs, and our evaluation shows that permuting the premise order can cause a performance drop of over 30%. In addition, we release the benchmark R-GSM, based on GSM8K, to examine the ordering effect for mathematical problem-solving, and we again observe a significant drop in accuracy, relative to the original GSM8K benchmark.
• Why Do Multi-Agent LLM Systems Fail?
  • Despite growing enthusiasm for Multi-Agent LLM Systems (MAS), their performance gains on popular benchmarks often remain minimal compared with single-agent frameworks. This gap highlights the need to systematically analyze the challenges hindering MAS effectiveness. We present MAST (Multi-Agent System Failure Taxonomy), the first empirically grounded taxonomy designed to understand MAS failures. We analyze seven popular MAS frameworks across over 200 tasks, involving six expert human annotators. Through this process, we identify 14 unique failure modes, organized into 3 overarching categories, (i) specification issues, (ii) inter-agent misalignment, and (iii) task verification. MAST emerges iteratively from rigorous inter-annotator agreement studies, achieving a Cohen’s Kappa score of 0.88. To support scalable evaluation, we develop a validated LLM-as-a-Judge pipeline integrated with MAST. We leverage two case studies to demonstrate MAST’s practical utility in analyzing failures and guiding MAS development. Our findings reveal that identified failures require more complex solutions, highlighting a clear roadmap for future research. We open source our comprehensive dataset and LLM annotator to facilitate further development of MAS
• LLMs are Imperfect, Then What? An Empirical Study on LLM Failures in Software Engineering
  • Software engineers are integrating AI assistants into their workflows to enhance productivity and reduce cognitive strain. However, experiences vary significantly, with some engineers finding large language models (LLMs), like ChatGPT, beneficial, while others consider them counterproductive. Researchers also found that ChatGPT’s answers included incorrect information. Given the fact that LLMs are still imperfect, it is important to understand how to best incorporate LLMs into the workflow for software engineering (SE) task completion. Therefore, we conducted an observational study with 22 participants using ChatGPT as a coding assistant in a non-trivial SE task to understand the practices, challenges, and opportunities for using LLMs for SE tasks. We identified the cases where ChatGPT failed, their root causes, and the corresponding mitigation solutions used by users. These findings contribute to the overall understanding and strategies for human-AI interaction on SE tasks. Our study also highlights future research and tooling support directions
• Easy Problems That LLMs Get Wrong
  • We introduce a comprehensive Linguistic Benchmark designed to evaluate the limitations of Large Language Models (LLMs) in domains such as logical reasoning, spatial intelligence, and linguistic understanding, among others. Through a series of straightforward questions, it uncovers the significant limitations of well-regarded models to perform tasks that humans manage with ease. It also highlights the potential of prompt engineering to mitigate some errors and underscores the necessity for better training methodologies. Our findings stress the importance of grounding LLMs with human reasoning and common sense, emphasising the need for human-in-the-loop for enterprise applications. We hope this work paves the way for future research to enhance the usefulness and reliability of new models
• Artificial Intelligence Is Stupid and Causal Reasoning Will Not Fix It
  • Artificial Neural Networks have reached “grandmaster” and even “super-human” performance across a variety of games, from those involving perfect information, such as Go, to those involving imperfect information, such as “Starcraft”. Such technological developments from artificial intelligence (AI) labs have ushered concomitant applications across the world of business, where an “AI” brand-tag is quickly becoming ubiquitous. A corollary of such widespread commercial deployment is that when AI gets things wrong—an autonomous vehicle crashes, a chatbot exhibits “racist” behavior, automated credit-scoring processes “discriminate” on gender, etc.—there are often significant financial, legal, and brand consequences, and the incident becomes major news. As Judea Pearl sees it, the underlying reason for such mistakes is that “… all the impressive achievements of deep learning amount to just curve fitting.” The key, as Pearl suggests, is to replace “reasoning by association” with “causal reasoning” —the ability to infer causes from observed phenomena. It is a point that was echoed by Gary Marcus and Ernest Davis in a recent piece for the New York Times: “we need to stop building computer systems that merely get better and better at detecting statistical patterns in data sets—often using an approach known as ‘Deep Learning’—and start building computer systems that from the moment of their assembly innately grasp three basic concepts: time, space, and causality.” In this paper, foregrounding what in 1949 Gilbert Ryle termed “a category mistake”, I will offer an alternative explanation for AI errors; it is not so much that AI machinery cannot “grasp” causality, but that AI machinery (qua computation) cannot understand anything at all
• “Weak AI” is Likely to Never Become “Strong AI”, So What is its Greatest Value for us?
  • AI has surpassed humans across a variety of tasks such as image classification, playing games (e.g., go,“Starcraft"and poker), and protein structure prediction. However, at the same time, AI is also bearing serious controversies. Many researchers argue that little substantial progress has been made for AI in recent decades. In this paper, the author (1) explains why controversies about AI exist; (2) discriminates two paradigms of AI research, termed"weak AI"and"strong AI”(a.k.a. artificial general intelligence); (3) clarifies how to judge which paradigm a research work should be classified into; (4) discusses what is the greatest value of"weak AI"if it has no chance to develop into"strong AI
• Can Large Language Models Infer Causation from Correlation?
  • Causal inference is one of the hallmarks of human intelligence. While the field of CausalNLP has attracted much interest in the recent years, existing causal inference datasets in NLP primarily rely on discovering causality from empirical knowledge (e.g., commonsense knowledge). In this work, we propose the first benchmark dataset to test the pure causal inference skills of large language models (LLMs). Specifically, we formulate a novel task Corr2Cause, which takes a set of correlational statements and determines the causal relationship between the variables. We curate a large-scale dataset of more than 200K samples, on which we evaluate seventeen existing LLMs. Through our experiments, we identify a key shortcoming of LLMs in terms of their causal inference skills, and show that these models achieve almost close to random performance on the task. This shortcoming is somewhat mitigated when we try to re-purpose LLMs for this skill via finetuning, but we find that these models still fail to generalize – they can only perform causal inference in in-distribution settings when variable names and textual expressions used in the queries are similar to those in the training set, but fail in out-of-distribution settings generated by perturbing these queries. Corr2Cause is a challenging task for LLMs, and would be helpful in guiding future research on improving LLMs’ pure reasoning skills and generalizability. Our data is at https://huggingface.co/datasets/causalnlp/corr2cause. Our code is at https://github.com/causalNLP/corr2cause
• Correction: ChatGPT is bullshit
  • Recently, there has been considerable interest in large language models: machine learning systems which produce human-like text and dialogue. Applications of these systems have been plagued by persistent inaccuracies in their output; these are often called “AI hallucinations”. We argue that these falsehoods, and the overall activity of large language models, is better understood as bullshit in the sense explored by Frankfurt (On Bullshit, Princeton, 2005): the models are in an important way indifferent to the truth of their outputs. We distinguish two ways in which the models can be said to be bullshitters, and argue that they clearly meet at least one of these definitions. We further argue that describing AI misrepresentations as bullshit is both a more useful and more accurate way of predicting and discussing the behaviour of these systems
• Beware of botshit: How to manage the epistemic risks of generative chatbots
  • Advances in large language model (LLM) technology enable chatbots to generate and analyze content for our work. Generative chatbots do this work by predicting responses rather than knowing the meaning of their responses. In other words, chatbots can produce coherent-sounding but inaccurate or fabricated content, referred to as hallucinations. When humans uncritically use this untruthful content, it becomes what we call botshit. This article focuses on how to use chatbots for content generation work while mitigating the epistemic (i.e., the process of producing knowledge) risks associated with botshit. Drawing on risk management research, we introduce a typology framework that orients how chatbots can be used based on two dimensions: response veracity verifiability and response veracity importance. The framework identifies four modes of chatbot work (authenticated, autonomous, automated, and augmented) with a botshit-related risk (ignorance, miscalibration, routinization, and black boxing). We describe and illustrate each mode and offer advice to help chatbot users guard against the botshit risks that come with each mode
• Artificial Hallucinations in ChatGPT: Implications in Scientific Writing
  • While still in its infancy, ChatGPT (Generative Pretrained Transformer), introduced in November 2022, is bound to hugely impact many industries, including healthcare, medical education, biomedical research, and scientific writing. Implications of ChatGPT, that new chatbot introduced by OpenAI on academic writing, is largely unknown. In response to the Journal of Medical Science (Cureus) Turing Test - call for case reports written with the assistance of ChatGPT, we present two cases one of homocystinuria-associated osteoporosis, and the other is on late-onset Pompe disease (LOPD), a rare metabolic disorder. We tested ChatGPT to write about the pathogenesis of these conditions. We documented the positive, negative, and rather troubling aspects of our newly introduced chatbot’s performance
• Survey of Hallucination in Natural Language Generation
  • Natural Language Generation (NLG) has improved exponentially in recent years thanks to the development of sequence-to-sequence deep learning technologies such as Transformer-based language models. This advancement has led to more fluent and coherent NLG, leading to improved development in downstream tasks such as abstractive summarization, dialogue generation, and data-to-text generation. However, it is also apparent that deep learning based generation is prone to hallucinate unintended text, which degrades the system performance and fails to meet user expectations in many real-world scenarios. To address this issue, many studies have been presented in measuring and mitigating hallucinated texts, but these have never been reviewed in a comprehensive manner before. In this survey, we thus provide a broad overview of the research progress and challenges in the hallucination problem in NLG. The survey is organized into two parts: (1) a general overview of metrics, mitigation methods, and future directions, and (2) an overview of task-specific research progress on hallucinations in the following downstream tasks, namely abstractive summarization, dialogue generation, generative question answering, data-to-text generation, and machine translation. This survey serves to facilitate collaborative efforts among researchers in tackling the challenge of hallucinated texts in NLG
• TruthfulQA: Measuring How Models Mimic Human Falsehoods
  • We propose a benchmark to measure whether a language model is truthful in generating answers to questions. The benchmark comprises 817 questions that span 38 categories, including health, law, finance and politics. We crafted questions that some humans would answer falsely due to a false belief or misconception. To perform well, models must avoid generating false answers learned from imitating human texts. We tested GPT-3, GPT-Neo/J, GPT-2 and a T5-based model. The best model was truthful on 58% of questions, while human performance was 94%. Models generated many false answers that mimic popular misconceptions and have the potential to deceive humans. The largest models were generally the least truthful. This contrasts with other NLP tasks, where performance improves with model size. However, this result is expected if false answers are learned from the training distribution. We suggest that scaling up models alone is less promising for improving truthfulness than fine-tuning using training objectives other than imitation of text from the web
• Red Teaming Language Models with Language Models
  • Language Models (LMs) often cannot be deployed because of their potential to harm users in hard-to-predict ways. Prior work identifies harmful behaviors before deployment by using human annotators to hand-write test cases. However, human annotation is expensive, limiting the number and diversity of test cases. In this work, we automatically find cases where a target LM behaves in a harmful way, by generating test cases (“red teaming”) using another LM. We evaluate the target LM’s replies to generated test questions using a classifier trained to detect offensive content, uncovering tens of thousands of offensive replies in a 280B parameter LM chatbot. We explore several methods, from zero-shot generation to reinforcement learning, for generating test cases with varying levels of diversity and difficulty. Furthermore, we use prompt engineering to control LM-generated test cases to uncover a variety of other harms, automatically finding groups of people that the chatbot discusses in offensive ways, personal and hospital phone numbers generated as the chatbot’s own contact info, leakage of private training data in generated text, and harms that occur over the course of a conversation. Overall, LM-based red teaming is one promising tool (among many needed) for finding and fixing diverse, undesirable LM behaviors before impacting users.
• Mathematical Capabilities of ChatGPT
  • We investigate the mathematical capabilities of two iterations of ChatGPT (released 9-January-2023 and 30-January-2023) and of GPT-4 by testing them on publicly available datasets, as well as hand-crafted ones, using a novel methodology. In contrast to formal mathematics, where large databases of formal proofs are available (e.g., the Lean Mathematical Library), current datasets of natural-language mathematics, used to benchmark language models, either cover only elementary mathematics or are very small. We address this by publicly releasing two new datasets: GHOSTS and miniGHOSTS. These are the first natural-language datasets curated by working researchers in mathematics that (1) aim to cover graduate-level mathematics, (2) provide a holistic overview of the mathematical capabilities of language models, and (3) distinguish multiple dimensions of mathematical reasoning. These datasets also test whether ChatGPT and GPT-4 can be helpful assistants to professional mathematicians by emulating use cases that arise in the daily professional activities of mathematicians. We benchmark the models on a range of fine-grained performance metrics. For advanced mathematics, this is the most detailed evaluation effort to date. We find that ChatGPT can be used most successfully as a mathematical assistant for querying facts, acting as a mathematical search engine and knowledge base interface. GPT-4 can additionally be used for undergraduate-level mathematics but fails on graduate-level difficulty. Contrary to many positive reports in the media about GPT-4 and ChatGPT’s exam-solving abilities (a potential case of selection bias), their overall mathematical performance is well below the level of a graduate student. Hence, if your goal is to use ChatGPT to pass a graduate-level math exam, you would be better off copying from your average peer
• Explanations Considered Harmful: The Impact of Misleading Explanations on Accuracy in Hybrid Human-AI Decision Making
  • EXplainable AI (XAI) has the potential to enhance decision-making in human-AI collaborations, yet existing research indicates that explanations can also lead to undue reliance on AI recommendations, a dilemma often referred to as the ’white box paradox.’ This paradox illustrates how persuasive explanations for incorrect advice might foster inappropriate trust in AI systems. Our study extends beyond the traditional scope of the white box paradox by proposing a framework for examining explanation inadequacy. We specifically investigate how accurate AI advice, when paired with misleading explanations, affects decision-making in logic puzzle tasks. Our findings introduce the concept of the ‘XAI halo effect,’ where participants were influenced by the misleading explanations to the extent that they did not verify the correctness of the advice, despite its accuracy. This effect reveals a nuanced challenge in XAI, where even correct advice can lead to misjudgment if the accompanying explanations are not coherent and contextually relevant. The study highlights the critical need for explanations to be both accurate and relevant, especially in contexts where decision accuracy is paramount. This calls into question the use of explanations in situations where their potential to mislead outweighs their transparency or educational value
• Stop explaining black box machine learning models for high stakes decisions and use interpretable models instead
  • Black box machine learning models are currently being used for high-stakes decision making throughout society, causing problems in healthcare, criminal justice and other domains. Some people hope that creating methods for explaining these black box models will alleviate some of the problems, but trying to explain black box models, rather than creating models that are interpretable in the first place, is likely to perpetuate bad practice and can potentially cause great harm to society. The way forward is to design models that are inherently interpretable. This Perspective clarifies the chasm between explaining black boxes and using inherently interpretable models, outlines several key reasons why explainable black boxes should be avoided in high-stakes decisions, identifies challenges to interpretable machine learning, and provides several example applications where interpretable models could potentially replace black box models in criminal justice, healthcare and computer vision. There has been a recent rise of interest in developing methods for ‘explainable AI’, where models are created to explain how a first ‘black box’ machine learning model arrives at a specific decision. It can be argued that instead efforts should be directed at building inherently interpretable models in the first place, in particular where they are applied in applications that directly affect human lives, such as in healthcare and criminal justice
• Thinking responsibly about responsible AI and ‘the dark side’ of AI
  • Artificial Intelligence (AI) has been argued to offer a myriad of improvements in how we work and live. The notion of AI comprises a wide-ranging set of technologies that allow individuals and organizations to integrate and analyze data and use that insight to improve or automate decision-making. While most attention has been placed on the positive aspects companies realize by the adoption by the adoption and use of AI, there is a growing concern around the negative and unintended consequences of such technologies. In this special issue we have made a call for research papers that help us explore the dark side of AI use. By adopting a dark side lens, we aimed to expand our understanding of how AI should be implemented in practice, and how to minimize or avoid negative outcomes. In this editorial, we build on the notion of responsible AI, to highlight the different ways in which AI can potentially produce unintended consequences, as well as to suggest alternative paths future IS research can follow to improve our knowledge about how to mitigate such occurrences. We further expand on dark side theorizing in order to uncover hidden assumptions of current literature as well as to propose other prominent themes that can guide future IS research on AI adoption and use
• GSM-Symbolic: Understanding the Limitations of Mathematical Reasoning in Large Language Models
  • Recent advancements in Large Language Models (LLMs) have sparked interest in their formal reasoning capabilities, particularly in mathematics. The GSM8K benchmark is widely used to assess the mathematical reasoning of models on grade-school-level questions. While the performance of LLMs on GSM8K has significantly improved in recent years, it remains unclear whether their mathematical reasoning capabilities have genuinely advanced, raising questions about the reliability of the reported metrics. To address these concerns, we conduct a large-scale study on several SOTA open and closed models. To overcome the limitations of existing evaluations, we introduce GSM-Symbolic, an improved benchmark created from symbolic templates that allow for the generation of a diverse set of questions. GSM-Symbolic enables more controllable evaluations, providing key insights and more reliable metrics for measuring the reasoning capabilities of models. Our findings reveal that LLMs exhibit noticeable variance when responding to different instantiations of the same question. Specifically, the performance of all models declines when only the numerical values in the question are altered in the GSM-Symbolic benchmark. Furthermore, we investigate the fragility of mathematical reasoning in these models and show that their performance significantly deteriorates as the number of clauses in a question increases. We hypothesize that this decline is because current LLMs cannot perform genuine logical reasoning; they replicate reasoning steps from their training data. Adding a single clause that seems relevant to the question causes significant performance drops (up to 65%) across all state-of-the-art models, even though the clause doesn’t contribute to the reasoning chain needed for the final answer. Overall, our work offers a more nuanced understanding of LLMs’ capabilities and limitations in mathematical reasoning
• When Can Transformers Reason With Abstract Symbols?
  • We investigate the capabilities of transformer models on relational reasoning tasks. In these tasks, models are trained on a set of strings encoding abstract relations, and are then tested out-of-distribution on data that contains symbols that did not appear in the training dataset. We prove that for any relational reasoning task in a large family of tasks, transformers learn the abstract relations and generalize to the test set when trained by gradient descent on sufficiently large quantities of training data. This is in contrast to classical fully-connected networks, which we prove fail to learn to reason. Our results inspire modifications of the transformer architecture that add only two trainable parameters per head, and that we empirically demonstrate improve data efficiency for learning to reason
• Limits of Transformer Language Models on Learning to Compose Algorithms
  • We analyze the capabilities of Transformer language models in learning compositional discrete tasks. To this end, we evaluate training LLaMA models and prompting GPT-4 and Gemini on four tasks demanding to learn a composition of several discrete sub-tasks. In particular, we measure how well these models can reuse primitives observable in the sub-tasks to learn the composition task. Our results indicate that compositional learning in state-of-the-art Transformer language models is highly sample inefficient: LLaMA requires more data samples than relearning all sub-tasks from scratch to learn the compositional task; in-context prompting with few samples is unreliable and fails at executing the sub-tasks or correcting the errors in multi-round code generation. Further, by leveraging complexity theory, we support these findings with a theoretical analysis focused on the sample inefficiency of gradient descent in memorizing feedforward models. We open source our code at https://github.com/IBM/limitations-lm-algorithmic-compositional-learning
• On Limitations of the Transformer Architecture
  • What are the root causes of hallucinations in large language models (LLMs)? We use Communication Complexity to prove that the Transformer layer is incapable of composing functions (e.g., identify a grandparent of a person in a genealogy) if the domains of the functions are large enough; we show through examples that this inability is already empirically present when the domains are quite small. We also point out that several mathematical tasks that are at the core of the so-called compositional tasks thought to be hard for LLMs are unlikely to be solvable by Transformers, for large enough instances and assuming that certain well accepted conjectures in the field of Computational Complexity are true
• RULER: What’s the Real Context Size of Your Long-Context Language Models?
  • The needle-in-a-haystack (NIAH) test, which examines the ability to retrieve a piece of information (the"needle") from long distractor texts (the"haystack"), has been widely adopted to evaluate long-context language models (LMs). However, this simple retrieval-based test is indicative of only a superficial form of long-context understanding. To provide a more comprehensive evaluation of long-context LMs, we create a new synthetic benchmark RULER with flexible configurations for customized sequence length and task complexity. RULER expands upon the vanilla NIAH test to encompass variations with diverse types and quantities of needles. Moreover, RULER introduces new task categories multi-hop tracing and aggregation to test behaviors beyond searching from context. We evaluate 17 long-context LMs with 13 representative tasks in RULER. Despite achieving nearly perfect accuracy in the vanilla NIAH test, almost all models exhibit large performance drops as the context length increases. While these models all claim context sizes of 32K tokens or greater, only half of them can maintain satisfactory performance at the length of 32K. Our analysis of Yi-34B, which supports context length of 200K, reveals large room for improvement as we increase input length and task complexity. We open source RULER to spur comprehensive evaluation of long-context LMs
• An Empirical Study of the Non-Determinism of ChatGPT in Code Generation
  • There has been a recent explosion of research on Large Language Models (LLMs) for software engineering tasks, in particular code generation. However, results from LLMs can be highly unstable; non-deterministically returning very different code for the same prompt. Such non-determinism affects the correctness and consistency of the generated code, undermines developers’ trust in LLMs, and yields low reproducibility in LLM-based papers. Nevertheless, there is no work investigating how serious this non-determinism threat is. To fill this gap, this article conducts an empirical study on the non-determinism of ChatGPT in code generation. We chose to study ChatGPT because it is already highly prevalent in the code generation research literature. We report results from a study of 829 code generation problems across three code generation benchmarks (i.e., CodeContests, APPS and HumanEval) with three aspects of code similarities: semantic similarity, syntactic similarity, and structural similarity. Our results reveal that ChatGPT exhibits a high degree of non-determinism under the default setting: the ratio of coding tasks with zero equal test output across different requests is 75.76%, 51.00% and 47.56% for three different code generation datasets (i.e., CodeContests, APPS and HumanEval), respectively. In addition, we find that setting the temperature to 0 does not guarantee determinism in code generation, although it indeed brings less non-determinism than the default configuration (temperature (=) 1). In order to put LLM-based research on firmer scientific foundations, researchers need to take into account non-determinism in drawing their conclusions
• Inadequacies of Large Language Model Benchmarks in the Era of Generative Artificial Intelligence
  • The rapid rise in popularity of Large Language Models (LLMs) with emerging capabilities has spurred public curiosity to evaluate and compare different LLMs, leading many researchers to propose their own LLM benchmarks. Noticing preliminary inadequacies in those benchmarks, we embarked on a study to critically assess 23 state-of-the-art LLM benchmarks, using our novel unified evaluation framework through the lenses of people, process, and technology, under the pillars of benchmark functionality and integrity. Our research uncovered significant limitations, including biases, difficulties in measuring genuine reasoning, adaptability, implementation inconsistencies, prompt engineering complexity, evaluator diversity, and the overlooking of cultural and ideological norms in one comprehensive assessment. Our discussions emphasized the urgent need for standardized methodologies, regulatory certainties, and ethical guidelines in light of Artificial Intelligence (AI) advancements, including advocating for an evolution from static benchmarks to dynamic behavioral profiling to accurately capture LLMs’ complex behaviors and potential risks. Our study highlighted the necessity for a paradigm shift in LLM evaluation methodologies, underlining the importance of collaborative efforts for the development of universally accepted benchmarks and the enhancement of AI systems’ integration into society
• AI Failures: A Review of Underlying Issues
  • Instances of Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems failing to deliver consistent, satisfactory performance are legion. We investigate why AI failures occur. We address only a narrow subset of the broader field of AI Safety. We focus on AI failures on account of flaws in conceptualization, design and deployment. Other AI Safety issues like trade-offs between privacy and security or convenience, bad actors hacking into AI systems to create mayhem or bad actors deploying AI for purposes harmful to humanity and are out of scope of our discussion. We find that AI systems fail on account of omission and commission errors in the design of the AI system, as well as upon failure to develop an appropriate interpretation of input information. Moreover, even when there is no significant flaw in the AI software, an AI system may fail because the hardware is incapable of robust performance across environments. Finally an AI system is quite likely to fail in situations where, in effect, it is called upon to deliver moral judgments – a capability AI does not possess. We observe certain trade-offs in measures to mitigate a subset of AI failures and provide some recommendations
• CRMArena-Pro: Holistic Assessment of LLM Agents Across Diverse Business Scenarios and Interactions
  • Instances of Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems failing to deliver consistent, satisfactory performance are legion. We investigate why AI failures occur. We address only a narrow subset of the broader field of AI Safety. We focus on AI failures on account of flaws in conceptualization, design and deployment. Other AI Safety issues like trade-offs between privacy and security or convenience, bad actors hacking into AI systems to create mayhem or bad actors deploying AI for purposes harmful to humanity and are out of scope of our discussion. We find that AI systems fail on account of omission and commission errors in the design of the AI system, as well as upon failure to develop an appropriate interpretation of input information. Moreover, even when there is no significant flaw in the AI software, an AI system may fail because the hardware is incapable of robust performance across environments. Finally an AI system is quite likely to fail in situations where, in effect, it is called upon to deliver moral judgments – a capability AI does not possess. We observe certain trade-offs in measures to mitigate a subset of AI failures and provide some recommendations
• Impact of Pretraining Term Frequencies on Few-Shot Reasoning
  • Pretrained Language Models (LMs) have demonstrated ability to perform numerical reasoning by extrapolating from a few examples in few-shot settings. However, the extent to which this extrapolation relies on robust reasoning is unclear. In this paper, we investigate how well these models reason with terms that are less frequent in the pretraining data. In particular, we examine the correlations between the model performance on test instances and the frequency of terms from those instances in the pretraining data. We measure the strength of this correlation for a number of GPT-based language models (pretrained on the Pile dataset) on various numerical deduction tasks (e.g., arithmetic and unit conversion). Our results consistently demonstrate that models are more accurate on instances whose terms are more prevalent, in some cases above 70% (absolute) more accurate on the top 10% frequent terms in comparison to the bottom 10%. Overall, although LMs exhibit strong performance at few-shot numerical reasoning tasks, our results raise the question of how much models actually generalize beyond pretraining data, and we encourage researchers to take the pretraining data into account when interpreting evaluation results.
• Reasoning or Reciting? Exploring the Capabilities and Limitations of Language Models Through Counterfactual Tasks
  • The impressive performance of recent language models across a wide range of tasks suggests that they possess a degree of abstract reasoning skills. Are these skills general and transferable, or specialized to specific tasks seen during pretraining? To disentangle these effects, we propose an evaluation framework based on “counterfactual” task variants that deviate from the default assumptions underlying standard tasks. Across a suite of 11 tasks, we observe nontrivial performance on the counterfactual variants, but nevertheless find that performance substantially and consistently degrades compared to the default conditions. This suggests that while current LMs may possess abstract task-solving skills to an extent, they often also rely on narrow, non-transferable procedures for task-solving. These results motivate a more careful interpretation of language model performance that teases apart these aspects of behavior.
• On the Planning Abilities of Large Language Models : A Critical Investigation
  • Intrigued by the claims of emergent reasoning capabilities in LLMs trained on general web corpora, in this paper, we set out to investigate their planning capabilities. We aim to evaluate (1) the effectiveness of LLMs in generating plans autonomously in commonsense planning tasks and (2) the potential of LLMs in LLM-Modulo settings where they act as a source of heuristic guidance for external planners and verifiers. We conduct a systematic study by generating a suite of instances on domains similar to the ones employed in the International Planning Competition and evaluate LLMs in two distinct modes: autonomous and heuristic. Our findings reveal that LLMs’ ability to generate executable plans autonomously is rather limited, with the best model (GPT-4) having an average success rate of ~12% across the domains. However, the results in the LLM-Modulo setting show more promise. In the LLM-Modulo setting, we demonstrate that LLM-generated plans can improve the search process for underlying sound planners and additionally show that external verifiers can help provide feedback on the generated plans and back-prompt the LLM for better plan generation.
• Using Counterfactual Tasks to Evaluate the Generality of Analogical Reasoning in Large Language Models
  • Large language models (LLMs) have performed well on several reasoning benchmarks, including ones that test analogical reasoning abilities. However, it has been debated whether they are actually performing humanlike abstract reasoning or instead employing less general processes that rely on similarity to what has been seen in their training data. Here we investigate the generality of analogy-making abilities previously claimed for LLMs (Webb, Holyoak, & Lu, 2023). We take one set of analogy problems used to evaluate LLMs and create a set of “counterfactual” variants-versions that test the same abstract reasoning abilities but that are likely dissimilar from any pre-training data. We test humans and three GPT models on both the original and counterfactual problems, and show that, while the performance of humans remains high for all the problems, the GPT models’ performance declines sharply on the counterfactual set. This work provides evidence that, despite previously reported successes of LLMs on analogical reasoning, these models lack the robustness and generality of human analogy-making
• Language models show human-like content effects on reasoning tasks
  • Reasoning is a key ability for an intelligent system. Large language models (LMs) achieve above-chance performance on abstract reasoning tasks, but exhibit many imperfections. However, human abstract reasoning is also imperfect. For example, human reasoning is affected by our real-world knowledge and beliefs, and shows notable “content effects”; humans reason more reliably when the semantic content of a problem supports the correct logical inferences. These content-entangled reasoning patterns play a central role in debates about the fundamental nature of human intelligence. Here, we investigate whether language models whose prior expectations capture some aspects of human knowledge similarly mix content into their answers to logical problems. We explored this question across three logical reasoning tasks: natural language inference, judging the logical validity of syllogisms, and the Wason selection task. We evaluate state of the art large language models, as well as humans, and find that the language models reflect many of the same patterns observed in humans across these tasks like humans, models answer more accurately when the semantic content of a task supports the logical inferences. These parallels are reflected both in answer patterns, and in lower-level features like the relationship between model answer distributions and human response times. Our findings have implications for understanding both these cognitive effects in humans, and the factors that contribute to language model performance
• Faith and Fate: Limits of Transformers on Compositionality
  • Transformer large language models (LLMs) have sparked admiration for their exceptional performance on tasks that demand intricate multi-step reasoning. Yet, these models simultaneously show failures on surprisingly trivial problems. This begs the question: Are these errors incidental, or do they signal more substantial limitations? In an attempt to demystify transformer LLMs, we investigate the limits of these models across three representative compositional tasks – multi-digit multiplication, logic grid puzzles, and a classic dynamic programming problem. These tasks require breaking problems down into sub-steps and synthesizing these steps into a precise answer. We formulate compositional tasks as computation graphs to systematically quantify the level of complexity, and break down reasoning steps into intermediate sub-procedures. Our empirical findings suggest that transformer LLMs solve compositional tasks by reducing multi-step compositional reasoning into linearized subgraph matching, without necessarily developing systematic problem-solving skills. To round off our empirical study, we provide theoretical arguments on abstract multi-step reasoning problems that highlight how autoregressive generations’ performance can rapidly decay with,increased,task,complexity.